in other words that the income differential between the home country and the intended host country must be greater.
The continuing problems of surplus labour in the traditional emigration countries and humanitarian and political considerations and obligations on the part of the host countries have caused governments to seek ways of making repatriation economically acceptable and future mass emigration unnecessary. From this has sprung the idea of taking capital, and hence jobs, to the workers. This approach and its implementation have been recommended by international organisations such as the ILO and the OECD, in particular. The problems that arise are similar to those encountered in promoting underdeveloped regions in the same country. The availability of labour is not sufficient in itself. Even the prospect of low-cost loans and subsidies is often not enough to outweigh the advantages to be gained from the concentration of people and businesses. These derive, for example, from the existence of an infrastructure providing transport opportunities, energy supplies, health and education facilities or a services sector comprising banks, insurance companies, consultants and research institutes or simply from the more numerous contacts and sources of information.
The difficulties that impede shifts in investment at national level are exacerbated where transfers between states are concerned, especially where there are wide differences in the level of development that prohibit the use of many production methods. This is not to say that such measures should be dismissed out of hand, but let us not delude ourselves that foreign investment will attain a volume that will render labour migration superfluous. At present this is all the more unlikely as the current economic and employment situation does not exactly encourage such investment in the traditional emigration countries. Knowingly or not, the Western European host countries are now cast in the role of immigration countries. Given this situation, one wonders whether the experiences of traditional immigration countries in the admission and integration of foreigners might not be used to advantage.
The spectacular labour migrations of the past can certainly not be expected to recur in the Western industrial countries in the foreseeable future, but it cannot be ruled out that foreign labour will again be required for certain occupations once the economic situation improves. This possibility should be seen in the context of future population trends in the European industrial countries, where the average age of the working population will steadily rise as a result of low birth rates. In contrast, the rapidly growing populations of most Mediterranean countries and the developing countries in general might exert increasing migratory pressure. Against this background and in the context of the North-South Dialogue, the "controlled" migration of workers may again become conceivable and necessary in the longer term, perhaps in the form of structured immigration quotas along Swiss lines. This would be a possibility, partly because the figures on the size of the foreign population have always concealed large-scale inward and outward migration, which indicates that in a number of countries there is a substantial "rotation" of foreigners as well as an increasingly "resident" foreign population.
MIGRANT WORKERS
The Significance of Labour Migration for the Workers' Countries of Origin by Thomas Straubhaar, Berne* U nlike capital movements and the sociological aspects of migration, the international migration of labour was largely ignored by economic reseachers for many years. It was only the migration of workers within Europe from the early fifties onwards and its strong growth in the sixties that drew economists' attention to the problems of migration. Their interest in the subject * University of Berne.
INTERECONOMICS, January/February 1985 was heightened "by floods of refugees into the United States in the late 1970's, and by hundreds of thousands of 'undocumented' migrants, primarily workers coming from Mexico across the U.S. southern border". 1
One of the consequences of academic interest in this field has been an increase in the number of publications on the economic aspects of migration. Another is the fact that international labour migration was discussed for the first time in 1983 at the annual general meeting of the American Economic Association and in the Journal of International Economics as the general subject (Vol. 14, No. 3/4) . This article examines the importance of northward migration for the countries of southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey). 2 It is particularly topical in the light of the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EC, which is scheduled to take place at the beginning of 1986 but still remains uncertain in the wake of the EC summit conference in Dublin-in December 1984. The applicant countries' room for manoeuvre in the negotiations, particularly with regard to the freedom of access to the common labour market, will depend largely on the importance that they attach to northward migration.
Labour Market Effects
The most obvious effect of the emigration of employable workers is to ease labour market pressures. In Table 1 , a labour market improvement coefficient has been calculated on the assumption that each migrant was unemployed or could be replaced by an unemployed person. The coefficient measures the maximum possible net easing of the labour market that can result from migration. It is negative if return migration outweighs emigration so that the returning workers place additional strains on the labour market in their home country. It is assumed in this connection that returning migrants remain unemployed or force an existing worker into unemployment.
Over the period from 1960 to 1981 the easing of the labour market as a result of migration works out at a maximum of about one-third (Portugal) and a minimum of 2.3 % (Turkey). The coefficient came to about 5 % in the case of Italy and Greece, around 10 % in that of Spain and 15 % in that of Yugoslavia. Except in the case of Portugal, the net effect was therefore very small. Fewer than one in ten unemployed persons tried to obtain a job by emigrating. 
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The assumption that emigration can solve the problems of domestic unemployment therefore proves to be unfounded. Instead, it caused the domestic labour markets to depend on foreign demand not only for goods but also for labour.
This finding stems from a division of the period under examination into one period from 1960 to 1974 and another from 1975 to 1981. The period from 1960 to 1974 was marked by relatively strong cyclical demand pull in the host countries. At the same time, workers from non-EC countries enjoyed de facto freedom of access to the Community's labour market. During this period of few political barriers to labour mobility, one in two unemployed workers in Portugal and one in five in Yugoslavia, Greece and Spain chose to emigrate.
After 1974-75 restrictive immigration rules practically closed the EC labour market to workers from nonmember countries. Measures were also introduced to encourage workers to return to their home countries. In all of the economies examined, the beneficial labour market effect of migration was consequently far smaller between 1975 and 1981 than between 1960 and 1974. Portugal was an extreme case, with the coefficient declining from 51.4 % to 4.8 %. In Greece, Yugoslavia and Spain the easing of pressure gave way to a tightening of the labour market, causing the number of unemployed to rise by 22.7 %, 6.0 % and 3.4 % respectively. Even in Italy, which was exempt from the immigration restrictions on account of its membership of the EC, net migration shrank to nil, largely as a result of measures taken by a non-EC country, Switzerland, where the bulk of imported labour came from Italy.
The Human Capital Effect
let us now test the assumption that migrants had been unemployed in their home country or could be replaced by an unemployed person of equal competence. A high probability can be deduced if the emigration of workers has no adverse effect on output in their home country.
On the other hand, if migrants had a job and could not be fully replaced by unemployed persons or returning migrants, national product will decline. In this case emigration must be regarded as a loss of human capital from the point of view of the workers' home country. The loss is all the greater if the migrants are more highly qualified than the national average. This human capital effect poses a problem not only because of the workers' own previous contribution to national income but also because of the loss of positive external effects. In extreme cases, the emigration of one group of workers can destroy the jobs of complementary but less qualified workers who remain behind. Table 2 1 U0 = Unemployment rate taking migration into account (average for the period in %). 2 U1 = Unemployment rate without taking migration tnto account (average for the period m %). 1960-1981 1960-1974 1960-1981 1960-1974 
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Conversely, it cannot be assumed that there was a positive relationship, except in the case of Spain. In particular, the argument that returning migrants bring increased human capital with them also appears to be questionable. Skills acquired abroad do not seem to have been used to raise labour productivity in the home country. 4
Structural Change and Development Effect
Table 2 also shows the coefficients of correlation between migration and changes in the proportion of the labour force employed in agriculture. Irrespective of the period chosen, migration had a positive effect on structural change in Italy, Greece and Spain measured in terms of the decline in agricultural employment as a proportion of total employment. In Yugoslavia this positive structural effect occurred mainly between 1960 and 1974. No such relationship can be detected in the case of Portugal and Turkey.
The data given in Table 3 are designed to provide an answer to the question whether the effects of migration on migrants' home countries depend upon the level of development of the economy in question. With a critical correlation coefficient of _+0.73 or _+0.61 (for p = 0.95 or 0.90), the international relationship between the level of the national correlation coefficient and the level of development remains well below the significance threshold in terms of both average overall output and average agricultural output.
Once again, the link is much stronger if the period from 1960 to 1974 is considered in isolation. Over that period a statistically significant relationship (p > 0.90) can be proved between the effects of migration and the level of development of the economies under examination, measured in terms of either overall product or agricultural product: emigration had a more marked effect on changes in national product in those 3 Myrdal's view that emigration is an irrational and very costly way of solving labour market problems because the country of ongin has to bear the cost of educatton and training (G. M y r d a I : Internationale Wirtschaft, Berlin 1958, pp. 117 f.) must be questioned in thts instance. These are "sunk costs" that an economy is unavoidably obliged to bear on moral grounds. Faced with the question "what is the most effective use to make of extstmg labor, to employ it abroad or leave it unemployed at home", incurring support costs without making any contribution to national mcome (C. P. Kindleberger:
Europe's Postwar Growth, Cambridge 1967, p. 99), emigration appears to be a more beneficial answer for the individual migrant and does not seem to be damaging for the economy as a whole. economies that generated a lower average national product or agricultural product than the other countries in the group.
As far as the effects of migration on structural change are concerned, a connection can be postulated between the level of the national correlation coefficient between migration and the decline in employment in agriculture on the one hand and the level of development measured in terms of average national product on the other. Migration provided a stronger spur to the structural change towards a non-agricultural economy in countries with a higher average national product than in those with a relatively low national product.
The Balance-of-Payments Effect
Remittances of emigrants' savings from income earned abroad are an important element in the balance of payments of their home countries. They offset the often chronic balance-of-payment deficits, thereby reducing the shortage of foreign exchange. The often crucial restraint imposed on the economic development of the migrants' home countries by balance-ofpayments deficits can be eased, thanks to remittances. As they bear no interest, do not have to be repaid and their use is not tied to particular investment projects with a high import content, they have a more positive impact MIGRANTWORKERS on the balance of payments than other monetary inflows (such as direct investments or loans) which would have the same effect in purely accounting terms. 5
In quantitative terms, the importance of emigrants' remittances for the balance of payments can be seen in the contribution they make to covering deficits in the trade balance and in the current account. Table 4 shows the extent to which such remittances supplemented foreign exchange earnings from exports and hence helped finance imports. It also illustrates the degree to which they have contributed to an improvement in the current account, the central indicator of an economy's international position.
It can be seen that between 1960 and 1981 remittances -the outcome of the export of factor services-ranged from less than one-fifth of the value of merchandise exports in Italy and Spain, which have a higher national product per employee, to around twofifths in the less developed economies of Greece, Portugal and Turkey. A statistically significant relationship (p > 0.95) can be ascertained between the importance of remittances in relation to exports and the level of development.
Between 1960 and 1981, the average proportion of deficits in the trade account covered by remittances ranged from a minimum of 15-30 % (in Spain and Greece) to a maximum of 60-80 % (in Portugal, Yugoslav!a and Turkey). The ratio of the percentage covered to the level of development of an economy produced a correlation value of -0.96 (excluding Italy). Hence, the less developed an economy, the more important the contribution of remittances to covering trade deficits. This finding is further strengthened by an Table 4 Trade-balance and Current-account Effects of Emigrants' Remittances between 1960 and 1981 1960-1974 1975-1981 1960-1981 Countries Yugoslavia R' = (1 -Cim R -iim R ) " R expressed as the average of annual values for the penod (in millions of U~ $ at current prices and exchange rates).
2 R'/Ex = R' Export value ' 100, expressed as the average of annual values for the period in %.
3 R'/TB' -R' 100, expressed as the average of annual values for the period in %. A value of R'/TB' in excess of 100 signifies more Trade balance than 100 % coverage of a trade deficit and + (R'/TB') signifies the factor (in %) by which an existing trade surplus is multiplied. " R'/CAB' = R' 9 (for interpretation, see footnote 3, mutatis mutandis). Current account balance 5 s = Standard deviation. 6 SR'/STB' and SR'/SCAB' = Sum of remittances over the period --100 Sum of trade/current-account balances over the period S o u r c e s : Calculations by the author on the basis of data from: IMF: Balance of Payments Yearbook, Washington, various volumes from Vol. 11 (1960) As far as improvements in current account deficits are concerned, the proportion covered fluctuated widely from year to year owing to large variations in the absolute level of shortfalls. Over the entire period from 1960 to 1981, the proportion of the aggregate currentaccount deficits offset by remittances probably ranged from two-fifths in Spain and Greece to the full amount in Italy, with Turkey covering half of the deficit in this way and Yugoslavia and Portugal two-thirds. In all of the economies under examination the cover ratio was higher between 1960 and 1974 than it was between 1975 and 1981. Similarly, national product per employee was lower between 1960 and 1974 than between 1975 and 1981 in all of the countries concerned. The reduction in the cover ratio over time therefore supports the finding that the balance-ofpayments effect of remittances is less marked the higher the level of development of the economy.
Conclusion
In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn with regard to the effects of migration:
[] Any effect that emigration had on the development of an economy, measured in terms of changes in national product or agricultural product, is likely to have been positive; there is a high probability that it did not have an adverse effect. This finding is more strongly supported by statistics for periods of high net emigration (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) than for periods of substantial return migration or net inflows (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) .
[] In times of high net emigration, migration had a stronger positive effect on changes in national product in those economies at the lower end of the national income spectrum.
[] Emigration had a positive effect on structural change in the economy as a whole (measured in terms of the decline in the proportion of the working population employed in agriculture) and the effect was greater the higher the level of development of the economy.
[] The balance-of-payments effects were substantial in all of the economies examined; the contribution to covering current account deficits ranged from 40 to 100 % and that in respect of trade deficits from 15 to 8O %.
[] Emigrants' remittances amounted in some cases to as little as 8 % of foreign exchange earnings from exports of goods and services and in others to as much as 50 %.
[] The scale of balance-of-payments effects was determined mainly by the level of development of an economy. Both national comparisons over time and cross-country comparisons indicate with a high degree of statistical significance that the more developed an economy the less marked the effects of remittances.
[] Remittances constituted an important supplement to often inadequate export earnings, particularly in the economies suffering a shortage of foreign exchange such as Portugal, Yugoslavia and Turkey. They therefore reduced the need to raise high-interest, shortterm loans to bridge the widening gap in the balance of payments. 
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